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INCREASING SAFETY FOR BATTERED WOMEN AND
THEIR CHILDREN: CREATING A PRIVILEGE FOR
SUPERVISED VISITATION INTAKE RECORDS
Nat Stern *
Karen Oehme **
Client intake is used by a host of entities to obtain information:
government agencies,1 social service providers,2 and even law-
yers.' In many instances, intake may appear to be a mundane
bureaucratic exercise. Yet when used to elicit information from
victims of domestic violence, it can significantly increase the risk
of harm to the victim and her children. In supervised visitation, a
relatively new service that courts routinely rely on to protect do-
mestic violence victims,4 staff use intake to question a victim
about the risks that exist for her 5 and her children so that a safe
* John W. and Ashley E. Frost Professor of Law, Florida State University College of
Law.
** J.D. Program Director, Clearinghouse on Supervised Visitation, Florida State Uni-
versity College of Social Work, Institute for Family Violence Studies. The Clearinghouse
provides technical assistance to Florida's supervised visitation programs and serves as a
nationwide resource on supervised visitation for courts, legislatures, and social services
agencies.
1. See, e.g., Laurie M. Stegman, Note, An Administrative Battle of the Forms: The
EEOC's Intake Questionnaire and Charge of Discrimination, 91 MICH. L. REV. 124, 126
(1992) ("In a typical claimant's situation, on the first visit to an EEOC office, the individ-
ual completes an intake questionnaire which requests her name and address, the reason
for the alleged discriminatory action, a brief description of the action complained of, and
the name, address, and size of the employer. On the basis of this submission, an EEOC
official determines whether grounds exist for the filing of a formal charge.").
2. See, e.g., Lorne Sossin, Boldly Going Where No Law has Gone Before: Call Centres,
Intake Scripts, Database Fields, and Discretionary Justice in Social Assistance, 42
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 363, 373-75 (2004) (stating that public assistance decisions are often
based on telephone intake screening of vulnerable applicants at call centers).
3. See, e.g., Julie M. Tamminen, Client Relations: Client Intake Can Build Positive
Working Relationship, 11 ME. B.J. 6, 6 (1996) (stating that the "best way to plan intake
sessions is to determine what information to cover with clients to best address their con-
cerns").
4. See infra Part I.
5. This article refers to victims of domestic violence as females, while acknowledging
that a small percentage of victims of domestic violence are males. According to the Bureau
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visit between the batterer parent and the children can be pro-
vided.6 If those intake records later fall into the hands of the bat-
terer, however, as one victim put it, "you might as well give him a
loaded gun."7
Despite the danger inherent in the accessibility of these docu-
ments, they currently receive scant formal protection from efforts
of estranged partners to obtain them. This article proposes that
state legislatures enact a statutory privilege for intake records at
supervised visitation programs in domestic violence cases where a
court has entered a civil order for protection.' Such a privilege
would obligate a program to keep the victim's intake records con-
fidential unless she consented to their release. Part I of this arti-
of Justice and Labor Statistics, more than 85% of violent victimization by intimate part-
ners between 1993 and 1998 were perpetrated against women. NAT'L COUNCIL OF
JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, A GUIDE FOR EFFECTIVE ISSUANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT OF PROTECTION ORDERS, 1 n.2 (2005).
6. See infra Part II (further discussing the intake process).
7. E-mail from Melissa Scaia, Executive Director, Advocates for Family Peace Visita-
tion Program, to Karen Oehme, Program Director, Clearinghouse on Supervised Visita-
tion, Florida State University College of Social Work (Jan. 6, 2006, 17:00:40 EST) (on file
with authors) ("When we conducted a focus group of battered women about our services we
discussed confidentiality. One battered woman in the group said, 'If he had access to the
information I shared with you at intake, you might as well give him a loaded gun.'").
8. Our proposed privilege would apply when the court has (1) entered a civil protec-
tion order, and (2) ordered that the contact between the perpetrator and the children be
supervised at a supervised visitation program. Civil protection orders are available in
every state and American territory and in the District of Columbia. They are used to en-
join perpetrators of domestic violence from contacting, harming, harassing, or stalking
their victims. The overarching goal of protection orders is to protect the victim, not punish
the abuser. See NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, supra note 5, at 2;
see also, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(E) (2001) ("The court shall issue an order of
protection ... if the court determines that there is reasonable cause to believe: ... the de-
fendant may commit an act of domestic violence or the defendant has committed an act of
domestic violence within the past year or within a longer period of time if the court finds
that good cause exists to consider a longer period."); D.C. CODE § 16-1005(c) (2001) ("If, af-
ter hearing, the Family Division finds that there is good cause to believe the respondent
has committed or is threatening an intrafamily offense, it may issue a protection order
..."); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/214(a) (West 1999) ("If the court finds that petitioner
has been abused by a family or household member or that petitioner is a high-risk adult
who has been abused, neglected, or exploited, as defined in this Act, an order of protection
prohibiting the abuse, neglect, or exploitation shall issue ... Petitioner shall not be denied
an order of protection because petitioner or respondent is a minor. The court, when deter-
mining whether or not to issue an order of protection, shall not require physical manifes-
tations of abuse on the person of the victim."); MICH. CT. R. 3.207(A)-(B)(1) (2006) ("The
court may issue ex parte and temporary orders with regard to any matter within its juris-
diction, and may issue protective orders against domestic violence.... Pending the entry
of a temporary order, the court may enter an ex parte order if the court is satisfied by spe-
cific facts set forth in an affidavit or verified pleading that irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result from the delay required to effect notice, or that notice itself will precipi-
tate adverse action before an order can be issued.").
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cle describes how issues of domestic violence are being addressed
through judicial initiatives, particularly reliance on supervised
visitation. Part II describes how intake is currently conducted by
supervised visitation programs and analyzes the problems with
releasing intake records to batterers. Part III spells out the scope
of the privilege that we propose, placing its reach and rationales
within the context of existing privileges barring disclosure of sen-
sitive information.
I. JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO THE SCOURGE OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: THE ROLE OF SUPERVISED VISITATION
It is now beyond debate that domestic violence is among the
most serious and pervasive ills afflicting American society.' In
the American Bar Association's definition, domestic violence is
a pattern of behavior that one intimate partner or spouse exerts over
another as a means of control. Domestic violence may include physi-
cal violence, coercion, threats, intimidation, isolation, and emotional,
sexual or economic abuse. Frequently, perpetrators use the children
to manipulate victims: by harming or abducting the children; by
threatening to harm or abduct the children; by forcing the children to
participate in abuse of the victim; by using visitation as an occasion
to harass or monitor victims; or by fighting protracted custody bat-
tles to punish victims. Perpetrators often invent complex rules about
what victims or the children can or cannot do, and force victims to
abide by these frequently changing rules. 10
The sheer magnitude of the problem is staggering. Anywhere
from one to four million women" are assaulted by their partners
9. See MURRAY A. STRAUSS & RICHARD J. GELLES, How Violent Are American Fami-
lies? Estimates from the National Family Violence Resurvey and Other Studies, in
PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES: RISK FACTORS AND ADAPTATIONS TO
VIOLENCE IN 8,145 FAMILIES 95 (1990); U.S. ADVISORY BD. ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A NATION'S SHAME: FATAL CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT IN THE UNITED STATES, 7-10 (1995); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE BY
INTIMATES: ANALYSIS OF DATA ON CRIMES BY CURRENT OR FORMER SPOUSES, BOYFRIENDS,
AND GIRLFRIENDS 3-7 (1998); Peter Lehmann & Bonnie E. Carlson, Crisis Intervention
with Traumatized Child Witnesses in Shelters for Battered Women, in BATTERED WOMEN
AND THEIR FAMILIES 99 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 2d ed. 1998).
10. ABA Comm'n on Domestic Violence, Are You Being Abused?, http://www.abanet.
org/domviollareyou.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2006) (citation omitted).
11. Although there are victims of domestic violence who are male, this article will re-
fer to the victim as female and the batterer as male. An overwhelming majority of domes-
tic violence victims in heterosexual relationships are women. As many as 95% of domestic
violence perpetrators are male. New Beginnings: A Women's Crisis Center, Domestic Vio-
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each year,'2 and research has documented the immediate and
long-term detrimental effects of domestic violence on victims and
children. 3 Confronted by the dimensions of domestic violence and
its impact, judges have changed their view of the court's role in
assuring the safety of victims and their children.' 4 Most con-
spicuously, the judicial system has responded by creating special-
ized domestic violence courts and applying a therapeutic concept
to the function of the law in these cases.' 5 The result is often a
lence Fact Sheet, http://www.newbeginningsnh.org/html/dv-dv.html (last visited Nov. 7,
2006). Even in the relatively small number of cases involving male victims, much of female
violence is committed in self-defense and inflicts less injury than male violence. VIOLENCE
IN FAMILIES: ASSESSING PREVENTION AND TREATMENT PROGRAMS 42 (Rosemary Chalk &
Patricia A. King eds., 1998).
12. The most conservative estimate is that one million women each year suffer from
domestic violence; other estimates are much higher. See Community Violence Intervention
Center, Statistics, http://www.cviconline.org/stats.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2006). Thirty
percent of Americans say they know a woman who has been physically assaulted by her
husband or boyfriend in the past year. Children's Home Society & Family Services, Star-
tling Statistics on Domestic Violence, http://www.chsfs.org/Statistics-on DomesticVio
lence.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2006). Nearly one-third of American women report being
physically or sexually assaulted by a boyfriend or husband in their lives. Family Violence
Prevention Fund, The Facts on Domestic Violence, http://www.endabuse.org/resources
facts/Children.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
13. See Family Violence Prevention Fund, The Facts on Domestic Violence, http://
www.endabuse.org/resources/facts/DomesticViolence.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2006). Each
year, an estimated 3.3 million children are exposed to domestic violence perpetrated on
their mothers or female caregivers. PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON VIOLENCE AND THE
FAMILY, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY,
11 (1996). In a national survey of more than 6000 American families, 50 percent of the
men who frequently assaulted their wives also frequently abused their children, and chil-
dren who are exposed to domestic violence are more likely to exhibit behavioral and physi-
cal health problems including depression, anxiety, and violence toward peers. Family Vio-
lence Prevention Fund, The Facts on Children and Domestic Violence, supra note 12,
http://www.chsfs.org/Statistics onDomestic Violence.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2006). For
an in-depth discussion of domestic violence and its effects, see Mildred Daley Pagelow, Ef-
fects of Domestic Violence on Children and Their Consequences for Custody and Visitation
Agreements, MEDIATION Q., Summer 1990, at 347, 348-53.
14. See, e.g., American Bar Association, Judicial Checklist to Help Judges Protect
Children in Cases with Domestic Violence, 39 FAM. L.Q. 5, 5-6 (2005) (offering definitions
and facts about domestic violence, examples of abusive behavior, and questions judges
should ask about the violence, including whether visitation and exchange locations have
been arranged to ensure the safety of the child and victim-parent).
15. Therapeutic jurisprudence is the "study of the law's healing potential." Bruce J.
Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence Cases, 69 UMKC L. REV.
33, 33 (2000); see also Lowell D. Castleton et al., Ada County Family Violence Court: Shap-
ing the Means to Better the Result, 39 FAM. L.Q. 27, 33 (2005) (stating that courts tradi-
tionally did not deal effectively with domestic violence cases, which led to a "crisis point").
Ada County, Idaho, developed a Family Violence Court specifically to deal with these ex-
tremely complex cases involving issues of family violence. Id. at 27-29. For a broader dis-
cussion of the development of domestic violence courts, see Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward
Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 1285 (2000).
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comprehensive, multidisciplinary, community response to domes-
tic violence that integrates multiple services for the parties in-
volved.16 In addition, the American Bar Association (ABA) has
bolstered this approach by promoting the concept of unified fam-
ily courts.17 A unified family court
combines all the essential elements of traditional family and juvenile
courts into one entity and contains other resources, such as social
services, critical to the resolution of a family's problems. It is a com-
prehensive court with jurisdiction over all family-related legal mat-
ters. The structure of a unified family court promotes the resolution
of family disputes in a fair, comprehensive, and expeditious way. It
allows the court to address the family and its long-term needs as
well as the problems of the individual litigant. Through its insistence
on collaboration among court staffs and units, its "team approach,"
and its outreach to social service providers and local volunteers, a
unified family court can provide the highest quality of service to its
clients and its community. 18
The creation of these courts thus reflects growing recognition
that families have multiple, overlapping problems-e.g., child
protection, domestic violence, and divorce issues-which should
be addressed in an integrated fashion.'9 This new approach re-
quires courts, among other things,2" to identify and gather to-
gether resources in the community to address the needs of both
children exposed to domestic violence and their non-offending
parents.2' There is a "growing consensus" that a coordinated,
16. See Winick, supra note 15, at 39.
17. See ABA Coordinating Council on Unified Family Courts, Unified Family Courts
Home Page, http://www.abanet.org/unifiedfamcrt/home.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
18. James W. Bozzomo & Gregory Scolieri, A Survey of Unified Family Courts: An As-
sessment of Different Jurisdictional Models, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 12, 12 (2004) (quoting ABA
Coordinating Council on Unified Family Courts, What Is a Unified Family Court?,
http://www.abanet.org/unifiedfamcrt/about.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2006)).
19. See id. at 13.
20. For a thorough statement of the need for and benefits of therapeutic domestic vio-
lence courts, see Catherine Shaffer, Therapeutic Domestic Violence Courts: An Efficient
Approach to Adjudication?, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 981 (2004), which outlines the philoso-
phy and development of such courts.
21. See Donna J. Hitchens & Patricia Van Horn, The Court's Role in Supporting and
Protecting Children Exposed to Domestic Violence, 6 J. CENTER FOR FAM. CHILD. & CTS. 31,
42 (2005). Courts have been called on to conduct "individualized evaluations" of whether
the procedures and programs within a given court meet these needs. In a survey of juris-
dictions that have unified family courts, the most common support services were media-
tion (94%), substance abuse services (94%), parent education services (94%), adult repre-
sentation (89%), supervised visitation (89%), and guardian ad litem for the child (83%).
Bozzomo & Scolieri, supra note 18, at 15; see also Julia Weber, Domestic Violence Courts:
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community approach is necessary to address the problem of do-
mestic violence.22 As a result of this attempt to address the needs
of vulnerable citizens, every state now has a civil protection order
statute to protect domestic violence victims.23 Nearly every state
has adopted laws requiring family court judges to consider do-
mestic violence as a factor in custody decisions; many have a
statutory presumption against placing a child with a batterer
parent.24 The list of common community resources available for
courts to address family violence has grown to include parenting
programs, batterer's intervention programs, victim support, child
therapy programs, and supervised visitation programs.25 Super-
vised visitation programs, in particular, have become an increas-
ingly prominent part of efforts to mitigate the effects of domestic
violence. Indeed, in many domestic violence cases, the service of a
supervised visitation center offers the only assurance of safety to
the victim and her children.26 The crucial function of these cen-
ters stems from the continued access that batterers normally
have to their children. Despite the harsh effects of domestic vio-
lence,27 attorneys who practice family law are advised that the
Components and Considerations, 2 J. CENTER FOR FAM. CHILD. & CTS. 23, 31 (2000) (stat-
ing that "[olne of the more universal features of domestic violence courts is the increased
accessibility of social or community services for petitioners and respondents" in domestic
violence cases).
22. Lois A. Weithorn, Protecting Children from Exposure to Domestic Violence: The
Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment Statutes, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 8-9 (2001).
23. Shaffer, supra note 20, at 984.
24. Many state statutes require that judges consider domestic violence as one factor in
determining a child's best interest when making custody and visitation decisions. See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124(1.5)(b)(V) (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 3 2-717(1)(g) (2006);
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.23(k) (West 2002 & Supp. 2006); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
240(1)(a) (Consol. Supp. 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1530 (Supp. 2005). Other states
have a rebuttable presumption against custody for batterers. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
61.13(2)(b)(2) (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(2)(c) (West Supp. 2006); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 153.004(e) (Vernon Supp. 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(2)(b)(2c) (West
Supp. 2006).
25. See Bozzomo & Scolieri, supra note 18, at 15; Hitchens & Van Horn, supra note
21, at 42-43.
26. See Peter G. Jaffe, et al., Parenting Arrangements After Domestic Violence: Safety
as a Priority in Judging Children's Best Interest, 6 J. CENTER FOR FAM. CHILD. & CTS. 81,
90(2005).
27. There has been recognition of the severe effects of domestic violence on child vic-
tims. Children can be physically injured during an assault even if they are not targets of
the violence. See MARIA D. RAMOS, CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
CASES: A NATIONAL JUDGES BENCHBOOK § 3.10 (Michael W. Runner ed., 1999). They can
also be traumatized by witnessing abuse, and by seeing or hearing screaming, yelling,
throwing of objects, or name-calling in the home. Id. Children are also adversely affected
by observing the visible injuries of a battering. Id.
[Vol. 41:499
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reality of most court systems is that it is "not likely that [a bat-
terer] will be denied all visitation." 2' This practice embodies both
traditional public policy favoring continued contact by parents
with their children and empirical research supporting the benefit
that children gain from maintaining a relationship with both par-
ents. 29 The majority of states, however, now acknowledge that it
is not always in children's best interest" to allow a parent to
have unsupervised access to them, especially in cases involving
domestic violence.31 Unsupervised access in these cases can ex-
pose the children to continued violence, irresponsible parenting,
and undermining of the victim parent's authority. 2 Asking family
members or friends to supervise the contact between a batterer
and his children does not necessarily reduce these risks; the su-
pervisor may not believe the victim, may be intimidated by the
batterer, or may not have training in the dynamics of domestic
violence.33 Moreover, acquaintances do not provide neutrality, a
28. Dobbie Steyer, Structuring a Visitation Order for a Victim of Domestic Violence, in
THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE: A LAWYER'S HANDBOOK
252, 252 (Margaret B. Drew et al. eds., 2d ed. 2004).
29. See id.
30. The fundamental responsibility of family court judges is to determine the "best
interest" of the child and to render decisions that will promote their well-being. Clare Dal-
ton et al., High Conflict Divorce, Violence, and Abuse: Implications for Custody and Visita-
tion Decisions, JUV. & FAM. CT. J. Fall 2003, at 11. Most states have codified the "best in-
terest of the child" standard for custody and visitation decisions. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §
25.24.150(c) (2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-3(a)(2) (2004 & Supp. 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN §
60-1610(a)(3) (2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(1) (West Supp. 2005); TENN. CODE ANN. §
36-6-401(a) (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10(1)(a) (Supp. 2006).
31. See Scott A. Young, A Presumption for Supervised Visitation in Texas: Under-
standing and Strengthening Family Code Section 153.004(e), 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 327,
329 & n. 17 (2005) (including a list of state statutes addressing supervised visitation); see,
e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 571-46(9) (Supp. 2005) ("In every proceeding where there is at is-
sue a dispute as to the custody of a child, a determination by the court that family violence
has been committed by a parent raises a rebuttable presumption that it is detrimental to
the child and not in the best interest of the child to be placed in sole custody, joint legal
custody, or joint physical custody with the perpetrator of family violence."); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:364(A), (C) (2006) ("There is created a presumption that no parent who has a his-
tory of perpetrating family violence shall be awarded sole or joint custody of children ....
If the court finds that a parent has a history of perpetrating family violence, the court
shall allow only supervised child visitation with that parent."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-
22(3) (2004 & Supp. 2005) ("If the court finds that a parent has perpetrated domestic vio-
lence . . . , the court shall allow only supervised child visitation with that parent unless
there is a showing by clear and convincing evidence that unsupervised visitation would
not endanger the child's physical or emotional health.").
32. Lavita Nadkarni & Barbara Zeek Shaw, Making a Difference: Tools to Help
Judges Support the Healing of Children Exposed to Domestic Violence, FAM. CT. REV.,
Summer 2002, at 24, 28.
33. Id.
2007]
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crucial component of supervised visitation programs.34 Recogniz-
ing the potential hazards of unsupervised access by perpetrators
of violence, many communities have developed supervised visita-
tion programs. 35 As some commentators have noted, these pro-
grams may be essential to the protection of women and children
from ongoing abuse.36 The programs offer a safe and structured
environment in which visitation between the battering parent
and his children can take place.37 Historically, supervised visita-
tion programs were used to provide visitation in child
abuse/dependency cases: i.e., instances in which the child had
been removed from the home pursuant to an investigation of
abuse, neglect, or abandonment by child protective services
agents or law enforcement.38 More recently, however, they have
been developed to provide contact between batterers and their
children in domestic violence cases.39 Supervised visitation thus
34. See Nat Stern & Karen Oehme, Defending Neutrality in Supervised Visitation to
Preserve a Crucial Family Court Service, 35 SW. U. L. REV. 37 (2005).
35. Maureen Sheeran & Scott Hampton, Supervised Visitation in Cases of Domestic
Violence, JUR. & FAM. CT. J., Spring 1999, at 13, 13.
36. See Peter G. Jaffe et. al., Common Misconceptions in Addressing Domestic Vio-
lence in Child Custody Disputes, JUV. & FAM. CT. J., Fall 2003, at 57, 60.
37. See ABA Div. for Pub. Educ., Representing Victims of Domestic Violence 4 (2001),
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/representingvictims.pdf.
38. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.401(1) (2005) ("A child may only be taken into cus-
tody: (a) Pursuant to the provisions of this part, based upon sworn testimony, either before
or after a petition is filed; or (b) By a law enforcement officer, or an authorized agent of the
department, if the officer or authorized agent has probable cause to support a finding: 1.
That the child has been abused, neglected, or abandoned, or is suffering from or is in im-
minent danger of illness or injury as a result of abuse, neglect, or abandonment; 2. That
the parent or legal custodian of the child has materially violated a condition of placement
imposed by the court; or 3. That the child has no parent, legal custodian, or responsible
adult relative immediately known and available to provide supervision and care."). In
Robert B. Straus & Eve Alda, Supervised Child Access: The Evolution of a Social Service,
32 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 230 (1994), the authors place the recent growth of su-
pervised visitation in a historical context and note that supervised visitation began in
child protective services cases for children who had been removed from their parent's care
and spread to visitation in the context of divorce. Id. at 231; see also Young, supra note 31,
at 344 n. 190 (stating that the idea of visitation centers originally arose in family rehabili-
tation, not family violence, cases).
39. See Jaffe, supra note 26, at 91 (stating that one important development in the
United States is the considerable expansion of supervised visitation and exchange services
through the Office on Violence Against Women ("OVW"), U.S. Department of Justice,
which has poured millions of dollars into communities to develop supervised visitation
services for victims of domestic violence). The U.S. Code provides:
The Attorney General, through the Director of the Office on Violence Against
Women, may award grants to States, units of local government, and Indian
tribal governments that propose to enter into or expand the scope of existing
contracts and cooperative agreements with public or private nonprofit enti-
ties (1) to provide supervised visitation and safe visitation exchange of chil-
[Vol. 41:499
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offers judges a way to address the fundamental tension between
the policies of protecting children and of allowing their batterer
parent contact with them.4" Under this arrangement, the balance
struck in meeting the court's dual obligations is provided by
trained staff rather than by family and friends of the batterer.
Staff at supervised visitation programs receive training to under-
stand the dynamics of domestic violence.41 They therefore appre-
ciate that a woman who has left her violent partner is at height-
ened risk for "separation violence" as the batterer tries to reassert
his power and control over the victim. 2 This violence may repre-
sent either an effort by the batterer to punish the victim for leav-
ing or an attempt to force her to return to him.43 In either case,
the staff will approach their task with a measure of insight on the
nature of domestic violence.44
dren by and between parents in situations involving domestic violence, dating
violence, child abuse, sexual assault, or stalking; (2) to protect children from
the trauma of witnessing domestic or dating violence or experiencing abduc-
tion, injury, or death during parent and child visitation exchanges; (3) to pro-
tect parents or caretakers who are victims of domestic and dating violence
from experiencing further violence, abuse, and threats during child visitation
exchanges; and (4) to protect children from the trauma of experiencing sexual
assault or other forms of physical assault or abuse during parent and child
visitation and visitation exchanges.
42 U.S.C.A. § 10420(a) (West Supp. 2006) (emphasis added).
40. See Straus & Alda, supra note 38, at 232.
41. See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. § 26.2 (rev. ed. 2006) (setting forth the uniform standards of
practice for providers of supervised visitation, listing numerous topics on which profes-
sional and therapeutic providers of supervised visitation should receive training, including
domestic violence); SUPERVISED VISITATION NETWORK, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES OF
THE SUPERVISED VISITATION NETWORK at § 11.2 (2000), http://www.svnetwork.net/Stand
ardsAndGuidelines.html (providing that a Visit Supervisor shall complete training cover-
ing a variety of topics, including family violence).
42. Separated/divorced women are fourteen times more likely than married women to
report having been a victim of violence by their spouse or ex-spouse. YesICan.org, Domes-
tic Violence Statistics, http://www.yesican.org/dvstats.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
Sixty-five percent of intimate homicide victims physically separated from the perpetrator
prior to their death. Id.
43. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 65 (1991). Also, according to the National Council of Fam-
ily and Juvenile Court Judges,
[t]he process of leaving their abusers presents a heightened potential for
danger for survivors of domestic violence. Many survivors experience separa-
tion violence as the act of leaving or seeking protection from an abuser chal-
lenges the abuser's power and control. While the decision to leave may be
quite powerful for survivors, it also increases the risk to their safety and se-
curity.
NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, supra note 5, at 17 (2005).
44. See Praxis International-Supervised Visitation Technical Assistance, http:l/
www.praxisinternational.org/vista-taaframe.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2006), for a collec-
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Many states' domestic relations laws now formally recognize
the role of supervised visitation in resolving custody disputes.45
These statutes vary considerably in the degree to which they
regulate the manner in which supervision will occur. While some
simply acknowledge the court's prerogative to order supervised
visitation,46 others spell out in considerable detail the standards
of practice for visitation providers."
Whether by statutory directive or judicial initiative, most cases
are sent to supervised visitation programs by the court overseeing
the custody dispute.48 However, a judicial order may include little
information regarding the risks in the case. The mandatory Su-
pervised Visitation Order used in California, for example, in-
cludes a series of check boxes of broad allegations in the case, in-
cluding abduction, physical abuse, drug abuse, neglect, sexual
abuse, domestic violence, alcohol abuse, and "other."4 9 Other ju-
risdictions include no indication of the issues that resulted in the
order for supervised visitation. The standard Order for Super-
vised Visitation in Chatham County, North Carolina, for exam-
ple, only instructs the parties to use a supervised visitation pro-
gram and to participate in intake and orientation; it does not
require any assessment or identification of the risks involved.5"
As the New Hampshire Task Force on Family Law has observed:
Frequently, court orders do not include detailed court findings of the
risks giving rise to the supervision requirement. Such findings are
important to inform the parties and supervisors of what needs to oc-
tion of written and audio/visual training materials on making supervised visitation safe
for children and victims of domestic violence.
45. E.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-135(b)(2) (LexisNexis 1998 & Supp. 2005); ALASKA STAT. §
25.20.061(2) (2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-3-113(5)(b)(IV) (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-
46(11)(B) (Supp. 2005); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/112A-14(b)(7) (West Supp. 2006).
46. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-7(a)(2) (2004).
47. E.g., CAL. R. CT. § 26.2 (rev. ed. 2006).
48. It is accepted practice for programs to receive their referrals from courts. Federal
grants are awarded by the Attorney General after consideration of several factors, includ-
ing the extent to which the supervised visitation program applicant "demonstrates coordi-
nation and collaboration with State and local court systems, including mechanisms for
communication and referral" from those systems. 42 U.S.C.A. § 10420(b)(4) (West Supp.
2006).
49. PAMELA E. PIERSON & VANCE W. RAYE, CALIFORNIA CIVIL PRACTIcE-FAMILY LAw
LITIGATION, § 11:98 (2003).
50. State of North Carolina, County of Chatham, Order for Supervised Visita-
tion/Exchange, obtained February 26, 2006 (on file with authors).
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cur or not occur in the visits; to measure how the risks are or are not
changing over the period of the supervision requirement .... 51
It is this gap in information that intake at supervised visitation seeks
to fill.
II. INTAKE AT SUPERVISED VISITATION: THE NEED FOR
INFORMATION AND THE RISKS OF DISCLOSURE
To make up for the deficiency in court orders and to provide
critical information to staff, visitation programs conduct their
own intake sessions with each parent prior to monitoring any vis-
its. The New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Chil-
dren Professional's Handbook on Providing Supervised Visitation
describes supervised visitation intake records as including basic
contact, identification, and statistical data, such as parents'
names, addresses, telephone numbers, and children's names and
ages. 2 More importantly, intake questions also address the fun-
damental problems that have brought the family to the visitation
program. Screening for evidence of domestic violence, of course, is
especially important:
A thorough intake application should screen for a history of domestic
violence as a means of assessing the risk of harm to adults and chil-
dren.... Some areas to consider questioning are: whether any type
of violence occurred in the home . .. [including] a description of the
first incident and the most recent incident. It is important to find out
if the children witnessed the violence, and if they made any attempts
to stop it.
53
Interviews at intake cover a range of potentially pertinent top-
ics. Supervised visitation staff routinely inquire as to whether the
children have been abused, 54 whether either parent abuses alco-
hol or other substances,55 and whether the parents are on any
51. Nina Gardner, Report of the Task Force on Family Law, N.H. B.J., Winter 2005, at
20, 28 (stating that courts should develop protocols for supervised visitation or supervised
exchange orders because there is no uniform procedure in the courts for custody cases
where supervised visitation or supervised exchange is ordered).
52. Nadine Blaschak-Brown, Providing the Service, in NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE
PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN PROFESSIONALS' HANDBOOK ON PROVIDING
SUPERVISED VISITATION 67, 70 (Anne Reiniger ed., 2000) [hereinafter NYSPCC].
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 71.
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medication that can affect behavior during visitation.56 The
Wellstone Family Safety Program in Minnesota, for example,
uses an intake assessment to "establish[] if there has been a his-
tory of family violence."57 The assessment is designed primarily to
help staff determine "the level of monitoring necessary for the
visit.""8 Included in the information that staff seek to elicit are
details concerning the impetus for the request for visitation ser-
vices; risk factors presented by any of the parties, including the
risk of abduction and any history of violence; any history of men-
tal illness, substance abuse, or other parental dysfunction; and
parents' concerns about issues that may arise during the visits.59
In order to obtain this information, programs generally rely on
formal intake forms with a list of questions to ask the victim
about her domestic violence experiences.6" Programs may either
develop these forms themselves or use danger assessment forms
such as one created at Johns Hopkins University.61 Among the
questions about the batterer that this form asks a victim to an-
swer are:
Does he own a gun?
Have you left him after living together?
Is he unemployed?
Is he an alcoholic or problem drinker?
Do you believe he is capable of killing you?
Does he threaten to harm the children?
Does he use illegal drugs?62
Thus, supervised visitation programs seek such specific back-
ground information to assess risk to the victim, the children, and
program staff; to be attuned to the dynamics of the case; and to
inform the staffs observations at visits.63 In many instances, the
56. Id. at 71-72.
57. WELLSTONE FAMILY SAFETY PROGRAM POLICIES 27 [hereinafter WELLSTONE
POLICIES] (on file with authors).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 28.
60. See Appendix B, in NYSPCC, supra note 52, at 156, 156 (setting forth a detailed
checklist of suggested information to be gathered during intake).
61. DangerAssessment.org, Danger Assessment (2004), http://www.dangerassessment.
orglWebApplicationl/pages/daDAEnglish.pdf.
62. Id.
63. See WELLSTONE POLICIES, supra note 57, at 27-28 (including as information
sought during intake details of the reasons for the request for supervised visitation; risk
factors, including risk of abduction and history of family violence; history of parental dys-
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victims may not have divulged this information to the court. The
same reasons that may have delayed the victim in reporting the
abuse in the first place-shame, denial, fear 64-could have kept
her from disclosing specific information to the court. Accordingly,
she may have simply decided to provide the minimal information
required to obtain an order for protection.65
When a victim of domestic violence brings her children to a su-
pervised visitation program, she typically has already taken
many risks. By leaving her batterer, she has severely increased
her chances of violent assault or murder.6 Moreover, as the party
who requested the supervised visitation (where the court has not
ordered it sua sponte), she has publicly betrayed her partner by
exposing the dark secret of domestic violence. These seemingly
simple steps are profoundly difficult for many victims who may
have suffered privately for years.6 7 Once the victim arrives at in-
take at the supervised visitation program, she faces the reality
that her violent partner will be in contact with their children dur-
ing each visit. He will also presumably know at certain times-
i.e., the start or conclusion of the visit-either her whereabouts or
those of the family member or friend who will be dropping off and
picking up the children. Thus, both the victim and staff have a
stake in the victim disclosing the possible risks to supervised visi-
tation staff.
function, including mental illness or substance abuse; concerns about issues that may
arise during visits with the children; and requests for special restrictions during visits).
64. RAMOS, supra note 27, § 3.4.
65. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-2(a)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (stating that a
person who is or has been a victim of domestic violence or family violence may file a peti-
tion for an order for protection against a family or household member who commits an act
of domestic or family violence); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 81.001 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2006)
(entitling a petitioner to a protective order "if family violence has occurred and is likely to
occur in the future"). A victim may reveal part of the story of the family-just enough to
convince the court to order a protective order. For example, a victim may tell of one of two
instances of violence and threats, but may withhold a perpetrator's sexual abuse of the
children.
66. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
67. For a good discussion of the commonly asked question, "Why does a victim of do-
mestic violence stay in the relationship?," the Indiana University School of Law-
Bloomington has created a website called the Protective Order Project. The site has a
"Why She Stays" page that describes the hopelessness, shame, isolation, societal denial,
danger, and lack of resources that battered women face. Indiana Law, Protective Order
Project-Why She Stays, http://www.law.indiana.edu/pop/domestic-violence/stays.shtml
(last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
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Currently, staff at visitation programs generally advise victims
that the information they provide at intake is not confidential.
For example, Faith and Liberty's Place ("FLP") in Dallas, Texas
created a supervised visitation program after the 2001 murders of
Faith and Liberty Battaglia, whose father killed them while they
were in his unsupervised care.6" The large staff at FLP includes
approximately fifteen employees; some are contract workers who
only conduct intake, while other employees only monitor visits.69
This type of organizational structure makes sharing of informa-
tion essential to ensure victim safety. Intake at FLP is regarded
as "an opportunity" for the client to discuss what brought him or
her to the facility and "any questions, concerns, or other informa-
tion that he/she thinks FLP should know."7 ° The intake notes are
typed and signed by the staff member who obtains them.71 FLP
lists information to obtain during intake, and the program direc-
tor notes that the question, "'What brings you to FLP,"' invariably
yields relationship information. 2 Staff are already aware that
such information is important. The instructions for intake state
that staff should "let the client decide what they wish/need to talk
about as far as any abuse history. If [the] client chooses to talk
about abuse, re-emphasize that it will be recorded."73 FLP has an
established protocol for parties to obtain any program records.
Depending on the case, the program may require a subpoena
duces tecum before releasing record information. As the FLP "In-
take Issues" explain:
The intake is the opportunity for a victim of domestic violence to tell
the center staff her story .... It should be a time when a victim can
freely tell us what aspects of her life are most important to her for us
to know .... She may disclose aspects of the abuse that have never
come out before .... This record can be subpoenaed, and we are un-
68. FAITH AND LIBERTY'S PLACE, HISTORY OF FAITH AND LIBERTY'S PLACE (on file with
authors). The goal of FLP is to provide a safe, neutral, child-centered environment for
families affected by family violence. FAITH AND LIBERTY'S PLACE, FAMILY CENTER
PROGRAM POLICIES, § 1 (on file with authors).
69. E-mail from Ona Foster, Director, Faith and Liberty's Place, to Karen Oehme,
Clearinghouse on Supervised Visitation, Florida State University (Apr. 18, 2006, 13:03:27
CST) (on file with authors).
70. FAITH AND LIBERTY'S PLACE, FLP FAMILY CENTER INTERNAL GUIDELINES, Outline
for Conducting Intakes (on file with authors).
71. Id.
72. Telephone Interview with Ona Foster, Director, Faith and Liberty's Place, in Dal-
las, Tex. (Mar. 6, 2006) (on file with authors).
73. Id.
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able to prevent that from happening. Once information is subpoe-
naed, the abuser will have access to it .... [A]n abuser can then read
everything that the victim has reported to us. This clear message to
a victim that the conversation [she is] about to have with us could
end up in the abuser's hands is enough to ensure that many of those
conversations are stilted and filtered. This leaves us feeling that we
are lacking important information.
74
Other programs, well aware of the risks of the batterer's ob-
taining information from the intake records of the victim, have
chosen not to record the information that the victim gives to
them. One director noted that staff are responsible for remember-
ing what the victim identified as the risks in the case without
formally recording them." Although this approach may work over
a short period of time in small communities with little staff turn-
over, it is not an effective way to deal with long-term caseloads,
staff turnover, and the fragility of human memory. Still, the ap-
proach is grounded in the intention of keeping the victim safe
while obtaining enough information to keep the staff informed of
the risks to children and staff during the time that the perpetra-
tor is on-site.
If a victim is represented by an attorney, then the attorney al-
ready knows of the privileges that exist-and do not exist-in
that jurisdiction. In divorce and custody cases, then, attorneys
may advise victims of domestic violence not to reveal certain in-
formation about the batterer. For example, attorneys who repre-
sent victims already evaluate the risks and benefits of referring
their clients to counselors. Some commentators give advice to
lawyers who represent victims: "Caution your client about infor-
mation that she should and should not share with the counselor.
This approach is especially important when the communication
with the counselor does not fall under any evidentiary privi-
lege."76 When they are informed by lawyers or supervised visita-
tion staff that the information they reveal is not privileged, vic-
tims will have the benefit of being specifically advised not to
reveal information that may fall into the hands of the batterer.
This benefit, however, is a double-edged sword. By withholding
74. FAITH AND LIBERTY'S PLACE, INTAKE IsSUES: FLP FAMILY CENTER (on file with au-
thors).
75. Cf E-mail from Melissa Scaia, supra note 7.
76. Caitlin Glass et al., Custody and Visitation: Considerations for Every Attorney Re-
tained by a Survivor of Domestic Violence, 36 J. POVERTY L. & POL. 529, 533 n.34 (2003).
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the information, victims are keeping crucial information from the
people charged with providing for their safety-and the safety of
their children-at visits.
The problems that can arise from allowing batterers to access
their victims' supervised visitation intake records take on a vari-
ety of forms. The following scenarios-hypothetical but realistic-
illustrate the nature of certain recurring problems.77 All of the
custodial parents in these scenarios received orders for protection
77. The following cases present scenarios demonstrating that these hypotheticals re-
flect real-life situations for victims of domestic violence. In Sharp v. Arkansas, No.
CACR01-545, 2001 Ark. App. LEXIS 798 (Ark. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2001), a husband with a
history of violence against his wife was angry about their divorce. Id. at *1. He stole into
his ex-wife's house, hit her with his gun, threw her up against the fireplace, and kicked
her. Id. at *1-2. These acts all took place in the presence of her son. Id. at *2. The appel-
lant then placed a gun to her head, forced her to tie up her son, and abducted her. Id. In
Stevenson v. Stevenson, 714 A.2d 986 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998), the husband, in a
drunken rage, beat and tortured his wife. Id. at 988. She was so severely injured that she
had to be transported by emergency helicopter to a trauma unit, where she was diagnosed
as having suffered, inter alia, a fractured skull, a concussion, four broken ribs, and a punc-
tured lung. Id. at 989. She testified to a history of domestic violence on his part and ex-
pressed fear that her husband would take their ten-year-old son and leave the area. Id.
She reported that he would do "anything and everything to get physical custody and keep
their son away from her." Id. She added that their son was in the house during the forty-
five minute assault. Id. Paslov v. Cox, 104 P.3d 1025 (Mont. 2004), involved a public ar-
gument in which an ex-husband threatened to ruin his former wife's upcoming wedding,
.stalk her for the rest of her life, and harm both her and her children." Id. at 1027. In In re
W.L., No. 05-00-02023-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 1574 (Tex. Civ. App. Feb. 28, 2002), the
husband, among other salient abuses, choked his oldest child and hit another child in the
head with a broom. See id. at *5. In addition, the children stated that he had hit their
mother, used drugs, hit them with a belt, and threatened to throw them out the upstairs
window. Id. The father was charged with sexually abusing his daughter after she reported
abuse and had also been arrested five times for allegedly assaulting individuals other than
his wife (and at least seven other times for various other offenses). See id. at *6, *8. In
State v. Baldwin, 540 S.E.2d 815 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000), an estranged husband with a his-
tory of domestic violence brandished a gun and confined his wife and children against
their will for almost twenty hours. See id. at 818-19. He repeatedly pointed the gun at his
head and threatened to kill himself. See id. A final illustration of the domestic violence
that forms the backdrop of our scenarios is presented by the events that triggered State v.
Traeger, 997 P.2d 142 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000). After the defendant was told by his wife that
she wanted a divorce, he grabbed her, pulled her toward the bedroom, and put a string
around her neck so that she had great difficulty breathing. Id. at 143. Once in the bed-
room, the husband dropped the string, brandished a baseball bat, and he told his wife to
remove her clothes. Id. When she hesitated, he held the bat with both hands and hit her
foot as if he was hitting a ball. Id. The defendant continued to threaten her with the bat,
so she relented and removed her clothes. Id. He told her that she had destroyed his life
and he wanted to kill her. Id. As she struggled with the defendant, he continued to beat
her and eventually raped her. Id. The more that the wife struggled with the defendant, the
more he hurt her. Id. The wife told the defendant that she did not want to have inter-
course, but the defendant forced himself on her. Id. She eventually convinced him to take
her to the hospital; her foot was broken in five places. Id.
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against their partners. All are informed at intake by visitation
staff that the information they provide may be subject to disclo-
sure.
When Mrs. Meyer arrives at the visitation program for intake,
the director asks whether she believes that there will be any risk of
kidnapping at the program. Mrs. Meyer answers that Mr. Meyer
often threatened that he would kidnap the children if she left him.
She did not report that allegation to the court in her petition, be-
cause Mr. Meyer threatened to never let her see the children again
if she did.
Parental kidnapping is lamentably common in cases in which
the parents are disputing custody."8 If staff do not record Mrs.
Meyer's concern, the file will not reflect what could be one of the
biggest dangers in the case. If staff do record Mrs. Meyer's con-
cern, Mr. Meyer may subpoena the records and then retaliate
against her with violence or with the kidnapping that he threat-
ened.
Ms. Williams has a two-year-old daughter with her former boy-
friend, who requested visitation rights after the state sought child
support from him. She tells the supervised visitation staff that she
is aware of an abuse investigation that took place several years
ago in another state when he allegedly physically and sexually
abused his daughter from a previous relationship. However, Ms.
Williams begs staff to swear to keep this information-which she
found out a few months earlier-a secret. Otherwise, she fears, her
former boyfriend will "hunt her down like a dog." She asks staff to
"watch where he puts his hands" during the visit.
Child sexual abuse issues are frequently tied to domestic vio-
lence. Researchers have pointed out that the crimes of sexual
abuse and domestic violence are similar. Both deal with issues of
power and control of the batterer over a victim, both are crimes
78. In 1999, there were an estimated 203,000 child abductions in the United States by
family members. HEATHER HAMMER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHILDREN ABDUCTED
BY FAMILY MEMBERS: NATIONAL ESTIMATES AND CHARACTERISTICS 4 (2002), available at
http://www.ncjrs.orglpdffilesllojjdp/196466.pdf. According to one study, 34% of batterers
threaten to kidnap their children and 11% actually abduct them. Deborah M. Goelman,
Shelter from the Storm: Using Jurisdictional Statutes to Protect Victims of Domestic Vio-
lence After the Violence Against Women Act of 2000, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 101, 112
(2004) (citing Marsha B. Liss & Geraldine Butts Stately, Domestic Violence and Child
Custody, in BATTERING AND FAMILY THERAPY: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 175, 183 (Marsali
Hansen & Michele Harwey eds., 1993)).
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committed in families in secret, and children who witness domes-
tic violence may be more vulnerable to child sexual abuse because
they already have witnessed the power of the violence and dare
not resist the sexual abuse.79 If Ms. Williams suspects that her
former boyfriend has abused her own daughter, she may know
that she faces a common "double bind": mothers routinely are
prosecuted for "allowing" partners to sexually abuse their chil-
dren, but mothers who report the abuse to protective services also
are accused of fabricating the stories or "alienating" the child."0
Mrs. Tyler knows that her husband has several guns hidden in
the house, and frequently drives with one in his car. She has not
told staff, because she believes that Mr. Tyler will be enraged by
the disclosure and kill the family pets that she left behind when
she took the children to a domestic violence shelter. He also has
held a gun to her head in the past to get the children to "behave."
Firearms and domestic violence are often a fatal combination.
If Mrs. Tyler does not tell supervised visitation staff that Mr. Ty-
ler has guns, she is omitting a crucial piece of information in in-
take. That information is relevant not only to her and her chil-
dren, but also to the visitation staff and the surrounding
community. As research regarding domestic violence notes, bat-
terers who have access to firearms "pose a lethal threat to those
they have abused and to the wider community.""1 Most states au-
thorize judges to include in their protection orders provisions that
deny batterers access to firearms. Still, the federal and state fire-
arm laws are sometimes confusing,82 and a victim may fear dis-
closing the existence of firearms to the court or law enforcement.
If a batterer brings his gun on-site to supervised visitation-for
example, hidden in his car-the safety of the visit is severely
compromised.
79. See LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY G. SILVERMAN, THE BATTERER AS PARENT:
ADDRESSING THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS 90 (2002). One
study by researcher Murray Straus reported that 49% of batterers physically abuse chil-
dren, while only 7% of non-battering men do. Dalton et al., supra note 30, at 18.
80. Lynn Hecht Schafran, Evaluating the Evaluators: Problems with "Outside Neu-
trals," JUDGES' J., Winter 2003, at 10, 14.
81. Darren Mitchell & Susan B. Carbon, Firearms and Domestic Violence: A Primer
for Judges, CT. REV., Summer 2002, at 32 ("Abusers who kill their intimate partners also
may injure or kill third parties."); see also JAMES ALAN Fox & MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: INTIMATE HOMICIDE,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/htius.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2006) (stating that from
1990 to 2004, over two-thirds of homicide victims killed by their spouses or ex-spouses
were killed by guns).
82. See Mitchell & Carbon, supra note 81, at 33.
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Mrs. Smith tells staff that her husband is addicted to drugs and
often gets high when he is under pressure. She instructs staff.
"Don't write that down, just remember it." The staff member who
conducts the intake gets a higher-paying job offer the next month
and leaves the program.
There is a well-established link between substance abuse and
domestic violence. Researchers estimated that a significant per-
centage of men who commit acts of domestic violence also have
substance abuse problems.8 3 In addition, victims of substance
abuse may "self-medicate" to deal with the abuse. 4 Mrs. Smith
may fear disclosing Mr. Smith's substance abuse because she is
afraid that Mr. Smith will retaliate, or that he might reveal that
she is also using drugs. She may fear that such a disclosure will
cause her to lose her children in the child protection system. Su-
pervised visitation staff who understand the link between domes-
tic violence and substance abuse may know of community services
available that can help her with the dual goals of safety and so-
briety; 5 these can protect the children in the long-term.
Mr. and Mrs. Coleman have four children, ages two, three, five,
and seven. Mrs. Coleman suspects that her unemployed husband
is mentally ill, because he was diagnosed in another city after
what doctors called a "psychotic episode" at work. Mrs. Coleman
worked to support the family. She kept the children quiet and out
of Mr. Coleman's way when he seemed annoyed or nervous, in an
effort to reduce his stress and the often connected violence. Now
that she has left the household and obtained an order for protec-
tion, she fears that he will "fall to pieces" without financial sup-
port and help. She hints to visitation staff that Mr. Coleman has
83. See Edward W. Gondolf, Alcohol Abuse, Wife Assault, and Power Needs, 69 SOC.
SERV. REV. 274, 275 (1995); see also, JAMES J. COLLINS & DONNA L. SPENCER, RESEARCH
TRIANGLE INST., LINKAGE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES 1
(1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/194122.pdf.
84. The links between domestic violence and substance abuse are extremely compli-
cated, with the abuser in some cases forcing the victim to become dependent on substances
as a means of controlling her "and as a way to destroy her functionality and self esteem."
Denice Wolf Markham, Mental Illness and Domestic Violence: Implications for Family Law
Litigation, J. POVERTY L. POL'Y, May-June 2003, at 23, 25, available at http://www.lri.lse.
gov/pdf/03/030142_dv.pdf; see also Jane C. Murphy & Margaret J. Potthast, Domestic Vio-
lence, Substance Abuse, and Child Welfare: The Legal System's Response, 3 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POLY 88, 94 (1999).
85. See http://www.svnetwork.net/members/TelephoneTrainingArchive.html (describ-
ing training of supervised visitation staff in the dynamics of safety and sobriety) (last vis-
ited Nov. 7, 2006).
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not spent a great deal of time with the children, and that they
make him nervous. She is very worried about how Mr. Coleman
will cope at visits, but the issue of a possible mental illness is an
even bigger secret than the domestic violence was.
The vast majority of batterers do not suffer from mental health
problems, but a small percentage of batterers do have mental ill-
nesses and "would benefit from inpatient or outpatient psycho-
therapy and/or medication in addition to specialized batterer
treatment."8" Nevertheless, the responsibility for disclosing this
condition should not fall on the victim, who already has suffered
at the hands of her abuser.
III. PROTECTING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF VISITATION INTAKE
Our proposed creation of a privilege for visitation intake re-
cords flows from the premise that sensitive information obtained
at intake should be considered presumptively confidential. Thus,
barring exceptional circumstances, communications recorded by
intake staff should not be released without the consent of the
party who made them. The privilege would rest primarily on a ra-
tionale central to privileges already established in law: viz., the
necessity of candor by those who receive vital services to those
who provide them. In addition, we believe that domestic violence
concerns related to visitation presents grounds for confidentiality
not typically associated with the attorney-client and other tradi-
tional privileges. In aim and justification, the privilege for visita-
tion intake records would resemble the more recently adopted
privilege for communications with victim counselors. The special
conditions of visitation, however, call for a privilege with some-
what different contours and exceptions.
86. David Adams, Guidelines for Doctors on Identifying and Helping Their Patients
Who Batter, J. AM. MED. WOMEN'S ASS'N, May-July 1996, at 123, 125, available at http:ll
www. jamwa.org/index.cfm?objectid=5CDDAE24-D567-0B25-5119BOD21D103D2.
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A. The Scope of the Privilege
Under the proposed privilege, victims' 7 intake records would
be statutorily characterized as confidential documents.8 8 Incident
to the requirement, records would be kept in a secure place acces-
sible only to visitation staff, and only to the extent that informa-
tion was needed to ensure the safety and effectiveness of a spe-
cific visit. A visitation center would be prohibited from releasing
the record of an intake session without the knowing and volun-
tary consent of the party whose statements were recorded. Such
consent would have to be in writing with adequate assurances of
authenticity and absence of coercion. A center could reject a re-
quest for an intake record without ascertaining the preference of
the party whose statements it contained; however, the center
would be required to make reasonable efforts to notify the victim
of its action. Ideally, statutes would include penalties sufficient to
deter even inadvertent violation of the obligation of confidential-
ity.
Though designed to guard tightly against dissemination of in-
take reports, the privilege would allow for narrow exceptions.
First, of course, is the provision for waiver of the privilege inher-
87. This article reserves the question of the extent to which a statutory privilege also
should be granted to intake records of batterers, except for those who also have obtained
an order for protection. In those cases in which both parties have separate injunctions, our
proposal would confer the privilege on both, even though one of the parties in fact may be
the batterer. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(1)(i) (West Supp. 2006) ("The court is pro-
hibited from issuing mutual orders of protection. This does not preclude the court from
issuing separate injunctions for protection against domestic violence where each party has
complied with the provisions of this section. Compliance with the provisions of this section
cannot be waived."). This special circumstance aside, the concern over intimidation and
inhibition of victims that prompts our proposal obviously does not apply to batterers. In
addition, it may be that visitation staff should be afforded greater latitude in reacting to
threats and other ominous statements made by individuals with a history of violence.
While these and other considerations should ultimately be weighed, the scope of this arti-
cle is confined to what we regard as the far more pressing issue of ensuring that the goals
of supervised visitation are not undermined by ready access to intake records of victims.
88. Privilege ordinarily refers to a rule of evidence barring the introduction of a
statement into a formal proceeding without the consent of the holder of the privilege. See
Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client Confidences: The
Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 DuKE L.J. 203, 224-28 (1992). On the
other hand, a requirement of confidentiality forbidding disclosure irrespective of setting is
imposed by ethical norms of the relevant profession. See John M. Burman, Ethical Consid-
erations When Representing Organizations, 3 Wyo. L. REV. 581, 600 (2003). The statutory
privilege that we propose encompasses elements of both these concepts. As discussed in
this section, the privilege's reach would impose a strict but not categorical requirement of
confidentiality extending well beyond the courtroom.
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ent in the possibility of consent. Second, the mandatory reporting
requirements of child abuse laws necessarily would trump the
privilege. Thus, if a parent revealed to supervised visitation staff
that she was abusing her child, staff would be compelled to report
this information to authorities.8 9 Third, visitation staff would be
not only permitted but required to report information indicating
that either a child or parent was in danger of suffering immediate
physical harm at the hands of the other parent. To avoid defeat-
ing the aim of the privilege, however, this exception should be
crafted to assure that it could not be invoked lightly. A statute
could thus impose several criteria: e.g., that the harm threatened
is serious and imminent, that the reporting staff member has
good reason to regard the alleged threat as credible, that the
harm can be averted only by disclosure to law enforcement or
other appropriate authority, and that the benefit of disclosure
clearly outweighs the risk.9" Fourth, where violence is actually in-
flicted on a child or parent, a record of a prior threat could be in-
troduced as evidence of the other parent's intent as the accused
perpetrator of the violence. Fifth, since legislation cannot antici-
pate every instance of compelling need for intake records, a stat-
ute should contain a catchall exception for extraordinary circum-
stances not addressed in the specific provisions. Again, however,
the release of records under this provision should have to satisfy
89. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201(1) (2005) ("When the professionals and offi-
cials ... know or have reasonable cause to suspect . . . that a child is abused or neglected,
they shall report the matter promptly to the department of public health and human ser-
vices."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-711(1) (Supp. 2005) (stating that any health care provider,
law enforcement official, or any other person who "has reasonable cause to believe that a
child has been subjected to child abuse or neglect or observes such child being subjected to
conditions or circumstances which reasonably would result in abuse or neglect . . . shall
report such incident . . . to the proper law enforcement agency or to the department");
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.220(1) (LexisNexis 2006) (stating that any health care pro-
viders, therapists, counselors, social workers, or athletic trainers; hospital staff; coroner;
clergyman, Christian Science or religious healer; school administrator, teacher, or coun-
selor; any employee of a child care facility or camp; licensed foster home provider; law en-
forcement officials; an attorney; any employee or volunteer of an agency who advises per-
sons on child abuse; any employee or volunteer of a youth shelter; or any employee of an
entity that provides organized activities for children, who "knows or has reasonable cause
to believe that a child has been abused or neglected shall ... report the abuse or neglect of
the child to an agency which provides child welfare services or to a law enforcement
agency . . . not later than 24 hours after the person knows or has reasonable cause to be-
lieve that the child has been abused or neglected."); N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:6-8.10 (West 2002 &
Supp. 2006) ("Any person having reasonable cause to believe that a child has been sub-
jected to child abuse or acts of child abuse shall report [it] immediately to the Division of
Youth and Family Services.").
90. The rationale for this exception is further discussed infra text accompanying notes
132-38.
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a high standard consistent with the safety that is the overriding
goal of the proposed privilege and visitation itself. Perhaps inap-
propriate disclosure under the exception could be deterred by a
procedural safeguard such as requiring judicial authorization.
Moreover, while records falling outside these exceptions would
be shielded from disclosure, the privilege would not preclude us-
ing information obtained at intake in ways that further the goals
of visitation without betraying a party's reliance on the assurance
of confidentiality. Obviously, nonsensitive information readily
available through other means--e.g., names and ages-can be
shared generally with staff and with others who have responsibil-
ity for promoting safe and congenial visitation conditions. A more
difficult case would arise where a victim's statements indicate
cause for concern, but do not meet the exception for clear threats
of serious and imminent harm. In this situation, personnel re-
sponsible for security could be apprised that staff had determined
that a particular visitation presents a heightened risk of disrup-
tion or harm. Even on these occasions, however, visitation staff
would be expected to observe both the letter and spirit of the
statutory privilege in conveying information and inferences
gleaned from intake. Barring exigent circumstances already cov-
ered by exceptions, staff would not offer the intake reports them-
selves to security personnel. Nor would information be provided
to advance goals of law enforcement or investigation; rather, its
release should be closely tailored to personnel's need to be ade-
quately prepared for a potentially problematic visit.
B. The Utility of Privileges
The proposed privilege for intake records would not constitute
a novel measure. On the contrary, its rationale draws from privi-
leges conferred on recipients of services and other assistance
within a variety of relationships.9' In each instance, the law92 has
sacrificed access to potentially valuable information in recogni-
91. See generally Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1450 (1985) (examining the legal system's protection of communications made by in-
dividuals within the context of confidential relationships).
92. The development of privileges has been overwhelmingly a creature of state law.
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not recognize specific privileges. Rather, federal courts
are instructed to look to the state rule governing privilege in an action involving a claim or
defense under that state's law, and otherwise to determine the availability of a privilege in
each instance "in the light of reason and experience." FED. R. EvID. 501.
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tion that candor is crucial to the function of the relationship.
While some privileges have evoked additional justifications as
well,93 a fundamental aim of fostering frank communication per-
vades them all. Our proposal here rests squarely on this utilitar-
ian rationale. "
The oldest and most renowned of these privileges, of course,
protects communications between attorneys and clients. 95 Virtu-
ally universally adopted, 96 the attorney-client privilege is consid-
ered "central to the practice of law."97 The obligation of confiden-
tiality underlying the privilege is articulated and status en-
shrined by the American Bar Association: "A lawyer shall not re-
veal information relating to the representation of a client unless
the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly au-
thorized in order to carry out the representation[,] or the disclo-
sure is permitted by [one of the enumerated exceptions]. "9
Though not absolute, 99 the privilege will be sustained even in in-
93. These justifications have included protection of privacy interests. See Elizabeth B.
Cooper, Testing for Genetic Traits: The Need for a New Legal Doctrine of Informed Con-
sent, 58 MD. L. REV. 346, 374 (1999) (protecting the physician-patient relationship); Mary
Crossley. Infected Judgment: Legal Responses to Physician Bias, 48 VILL. L. REV. 195,
258-59 (2003) (protecting the physician-patient relationship); Thomas G. Krattenmaker,
Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 92 (1973) (protecting the psychotherapist-patient relationship);
David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court
Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 112-13 (1956) (protecting attorney-client and clergy-penitent
relationships); Stephen M. Wittenberg, Recent Decisions, Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am.
Gas Ass'n, 61 MICH. L. REV. 603, 605 (1963) (protecting attorney-client relationships).
Promoting individual autonomy is another justification. See, e.g., Robert D. Dinerstein,
Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 512 (1990);
Charles Fried, Correspondence, The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573, 586 (1977);
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L.
REV. 597, 605 (1980); Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relation-
ship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315, 340-41 (1987).
94. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996) (stating that "[o]ur cases make clear
that an asserted privilege must also 'serv[e] public ends'" (alteration in original) (quoting
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)); 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285 (John T. McNaughton ed. 1961 & Supp.
1991).
95. See WIGMORE, supra note 94, § 2290.
96. See Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 352-53
(1989).
97. Douglas R. Richmond, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Associated Confidential-
ity Concerns in the Post-Enron Era, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 381, 382 (2005).
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2002).
99. See id. at R. 1.6(b) (describing circumstances in which "[a] lawyer may reveal in-
formation relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves necessary").
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stances where the information that it shields might prove invalu-
able to the search for truth.
In validating the attorney-client privilege, the Supreme Court
has underscored the privilege's function of "encourag[ing] 'full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients
and thereby promot[ing] broader public interests in the obser-
vance of law and the administration of justice."'1 °° As the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has elaborated, the privilege arises from
the
necessity of insuring the right of every person to freely and fully con-
fer and confide in one having knowledge of the law, and skilled in its
practice, in order that the former may have adequate advice and a
proper defense. This assistance can be made safely and readily
available only when the client is free from the consequences of ap-
prehension of disclosure by reason of the subsequent statements of
the skilled lawyer. 101
Judicial acknowledgement that "[t]he fundamental purpose of
the attorney-client privilege is .. . to encourage full and open
communication between client and attorney"102 has been widely
seconded by scholarly observers. Echoing Wigmore's assertion
that the privilege exists "to promote freedom of consultation of le-
gal advisers" by removing "the apprehension of compelled disclo-
sure,"1 0 3 commentators have continued to emphasize the privi-
lege's value in encouraging candor and full disclosure by
clients. 104
100. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399,403 (1998) (quoting Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 499 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
101. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1960); see also Schwimmer v.
United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir. 1956) (stating that the attorney-client privilege
'exists to enable a client to have subjective freedom of mind in committing his affairs to
the knowledge of an attorney"); Anderson v. State, 297 So. 2d, 871, 871-72 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1974) (describing policy underlying privilege as "promot[ing] freedom of consultation
with legal advisers through removing the apprehension of compelled disclosure by such
advisers" (citing WIGMORE, supra note 94, § 2291)); Spectrum Sys. Int'l Corp. v. Chem.
Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1059 (N.Y. 1991) (stating that privilege "fosters the open dialogue
between lawyer and client that is deemed essential to effective representation").
102. People v. Meredith, 631 P.2d 46, 51 (Cal. 1981).
103. WIGMORE, supra note 94, at § 2291.
104. See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner, Conspirators' Privilege and Innocents' Refuge: A New
Approach to Joint Defense Agreements, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1449, 1471 (2002); Melanie
B. Leslie, Government Officials as Attorneys and Clients: Why Privilege the Privileged?, 77
IND. L.J. 469, 483 (2002); Mosteller, supra note 88, at 230-31; Sally R. Weaver, Client
Confidences in Disputes Between In-House Attorneys and Their Employer-Clients: Much-
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Privileges involving medical services rest on similar underpin-
nings. The physician-patient privilege prohibits a physician's tes-
timony about information conveyed by the patient in the course of
treatment. 105 As with the attorney-client relationship, the cloak of
confidentiality enveloping communication between physician and
patient is designed primarily to encourage patients to supply in-
formation needed to determine appropriate care. 106 Moreover,
within the profession a distinct privilege has evolved to protect
confidences disclosed to psychotherapists by their patients."7
While expectations of privacy obviously play a special role in this
privilege,"°8 it is also recognized that patients' trust in the confi-
dentiality of psychotherapeutic sessions is essential to effective
treatment. 109
Ado About Nothing-or Something?, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 483, 522 (1997).
105. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2235 (2003 & Supp. 2005) (providing that
"[iln a civil action a physician or surgeon shall not, without the consent of his patient...
be examined as to any communication made by his patient with reference to any physical
or mental disease or disorder or supposed physical or mental disease or disorder or as to
any such knowledge obtained by personal examination of the patient," except under statu-
tutory exemptions); HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-504 (1993 & Supp. 2005) (conferring on the pa-
tient "a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing con-
fidential communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of the patient's
physical, mental, or emotional condition" except under one of statute's exceptions); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(B)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (prohibiting testimony by "[a]
physician or a dentist concerning a communication made to the physician or dentist by a
patient in that relation or the physician's or dentist's advice to a patient" except under one
of Code's exceptions or in event of patient's waiver of privilege); Roosevelt Hotel P'ship v.
Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 355 (Iowa 1986) (stating that physician-patient privilege "is
given liberal construction, in accordance with its purpose to make consultation between a
patient and physician entirely confidential and free from disclosure in a legal proceeding"
(citations omitted)); State v. Broussard, 529 P.2d 1128, 1130 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (de-
scribing "subject matter protected by the physician-patient privilege, whether it be a com-
munication or information the physician obtains by observation or personal examination"
as "limited to subject matter confidential in nature, the disclosure of which would be a
breach of professional confidence" (citations omitted)).
106. See Laburre v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 555 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (La. 1990); Nel-
son v. Lewis, 534 A.2d 720, 721-22 (N.H. 1987).
107. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1010-1014 (West 1995 & Supp. 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 90.503(2) (West Supp. 2006) (providing that the "patient has a privilege to refuse to dis-
close, and to prevent any other person from disclosing, confidential communications or re-
cords made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of the patient's mental or emotional
condition... between the patient and the psychotherapist."); Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S.
1, 15 (1996) (confirming that Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence protects "confiden-
tial communications between a licensed psychotherapist and her patients in the course of
diagnosis or treatment"). See generally Robert M. Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Profes-
sions and the Law of Privileged Communications, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 609 (1964).
108. See Developments in the Law, supra note 91, at 1544-48.
109. See In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 638 (6th Cir. 1983); In re "B," 394 A.2d 419, 425-
26 (Pa. 1978); Major Dru Brenner-Beck, "Shrinking" the Right to Everyman's Evidence:
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Another privilege, for clergy-congregant communications, can
likewise be justified by its advancement of a social good without
losing sight of the nonutilitarian values that it embodies. The
privilege generally protects confidential communications integral
to confession, counseling, or other activities associated with the
clergy's capacity as spiritual guide.11° Though its current breadth
has been questioned in light of recent scandals,"' the privilege
continues to enjoy statutory recognition in every state and the
District of Columbia. 1 2 Like legislative protection of psycho-
therapist-patient communications, these statutes reflect the cru-
cial role of confidentiality in the effective functioning of a rela-
tionship deemed beneficial to the individual and society.'1 At the
same time, the privilege is also thought to implicate privacy" 4
and First Amendment 1.5 concerns.
A final privilege designed to promote valuable communication,
though protecting a relationship different from those already dis-
cussed, is the right of journalists to refrain from disclosing confi-
dential sources. The vast majority of states have adopted "shield
laws" granting journalists exemption from contempt proceedings
in most circumstances if they refuse to reveal these sources.116
Jaffee in the Military, 45 A.F. L. REV. 201, 209-12 & nn.57 & 60 (1998); Thomas F. Guern-
sey, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Child Placement: A Relevancy Analysis, 26
VILL. L. REV. 955, 961 (1981).
110. See Jane E. Mayes, Note, Striking Down the Clergyman-Communicant Privilege
Statutes: Let Free Exercise of Religion Govern, 62 IND. L.J. 397, 400-01 (1987); see, e.g.,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2005);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(3) (West Supp. 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.06(2) (West
Supp. 2005).
111. See R. Michael Cassidy, Sharing Sacred Secrets: Is it (Past) Time for a Dangerous
Person Exception to the Clergy-Penitent Privilege?, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1627, 1629-30
(2003). For a history of the privilege's development, see Jacob M. Yellin, The History and
Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 96-108 (1983).
112. See Ronald J. Colombo, Forgive Us Our Sins: The Inadequacies of the Clergy-
Penitent Privilege, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 225, 231 & n.39 (1998).
113. See Fred L. Kuhlmann, Communications to Clergymen-When Are They Privi-
leged?, 2 VAL. U. L. REV. 265, 286-87 (1968).
114. See Cassidy, supra note 111, at 1634-35.
115. See id. at 1700-22 (discussing bearing of Free Exercise and Establishment Clause
considerations on proposed "dangerous person" exception to clergy-congregant privilege).
See generally Christopher R. Pudelski, Comment, The Constitutional Fate of Mandatory
Reporting Statutes and the Clergy-Communicant Privilege in a Post-Smith World, 98 Nw.
U. L. REV. 703 (2004).
116. See Laurence B. Alexander, Looking Out for the Watchdogs: A Legislative Proposal
Limiting the Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need of Protection for
Sources and Information, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 97, 114 (2002); see, e.g., MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2005); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS
LAW § 79-h(b), (c) (Consol. 2001 & Supp. 2006); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942(a) (West 2000
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Unlike an attorney advising a client or physician treating a pa-
tient, an anonymous source does not minister to the personal
needs of the recipient journalist. In one sense, though, this spe-
cial dynamic makes the case for confidentiality of journalists' con-
tacts even stronger. Unlike the client or patient, whose interest
dictates supplying some degree of information to obtain appropri-
ate counsel or care, the ordinary source has no personal need to
communicate with the journalist at all. Thus, shield laws are
borne of recognition that much information of importance to the
public would never surface in their absence. 117
C. The Heightened Need for an Intake Record Privilege
In a number of respects, intake records present an especially
compelling case for legal safeguards of confidentiality. A victim
has a focused, concrete, and powerful stake in restricting knowl-
edge that she has reported behavior indicating additional specific
risks at supervised visitation. Conversely, the interest asserted in
obtaining this information is generally much feebler than with
communications that are nonetheless shielded by established
privileges. Moreover, the likelihood that the communication in
question would not occur at all in the absence of a privilege ap-
pears unusually pronounced in the case of intake sessions.
Empirical evidence supports the intuitive conclusion that a vic-
tim has much to fear from her batterer's awareness of the extent
to which she has told of his violent behavior.11 Widespread adop-
tion of victim counselor confidentiality laws".9 reflects societal
recognition that repercussions from having reported sexual as-
sault or other violence are far from speculative. In addition, the
law has reason to regard the typical party exercising an intake
record's privilege in a more sympathetic light than many benefi-
ciaries of testimonial privileges, particularly the privilege for at-
torney-client communications. However vital the attorney-client
privilege to the operation of our legal system, it is inescapable
& Supp. 2006).
117. See Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to
Protect the Journalist's Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 HOUS. L. REV.
1371, 1374-75 (2003).
118. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 889 (1992) (finding that
"'[b]attering husbands often threaten their wives or her children with further abuse if she
tells an outsider of the violence" (citation omitted)).
119. See infra Part III.D.
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that the privilege often serves to protect individuals from the con-
sequences of their misconduct. 2 ' Furthermore, the privilege nec-
essarily has an element of professional self-interest12' absent
from the rationale for protecting the confidentiality of intake re-
cords.
Not only is the need for keeping intake records confidential ex-
ceptionally strong, but the case for obtaining them is usually
weak. The successful exercise of a testimonial privilege, by hin-
dering the pursuit of truth, 122 entails the sacrifice of an important
government interest. For this reason, such privileges are con-
strued no more broadly than necessary. I23 By contrast, the ex-
perience of visitation staff directors does not remotely suggest a
comparably weighty need for intake records. The typical reported
request-by a batterer for the record of his victim's intake ses-
sion124-does not imply inherently that a significant purpose will
be served by granting it. Unlike a judge or jury seeking to ascer-
tain the facts relevant to a litigated issue, the batterer is already
familiar with the events that have been reported at intake. At
best, his desire to learn what the victim has told visitation staff
might be interpreted as simple curiosity, or even anxiety that the
120. Legislative and judicial acknowledgement of this truth is usually phrased more
delicately, but the gist seems apparent. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §
1200.19(a) (2002 & Supp. 2006) (prohibiting attorney's disclosure of information that cli-
ent "has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or
would be likely to be detrimental to the client" (emphasis added)); Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (stating that "if the client knows that damaging information
could more readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure than from himself in
the absence of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer" (emphasis
added)); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 631 F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating that infor-
mation concerning attorney-client relationships might be protected "if the person asserting
the privilege can show a strong probability that disclosure of the fact of retention or of the
details of a fee arrangement would implicate the client in the very criminal activity for
which legal advice was sought" (citations omitted)).
121. By encouraging individuals to seek legal services, Marion J. Radson & Elizabeth
A. Waratuke, The Attorney-Client and Work Product Privileges of Government Entities, 30
STETSON L. REV. 799, 799 (2001); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Corporate and Related Attorney-
Client Privilege Claims: A Suggested Approach, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 279, 285 (1984), the
attorney-client privilege obviously promotes the livelihood of lawyers. See Paul W. Vap-
nek, Ethics and Professional Responsibility Issues, in 835 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,
ADVANCED PATENT PROSECUTION WORKSHOP 2006, 7, 11 (2006) (describing "primary pur-
pose" of attorney's duty of loyalty to client as "encourag[ing] public confidence in the integ-
rity of the legal profession").
122. See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72,
81 (2d Cir. 1973); State v. Briley, 251 A.2d 442, 446 (N.J. 1969).
123. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44-45 (1980); United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); WIGMORE, supra note 94, at § 2291.
124. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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batterer's behavior has been misrepresented. The former does not
rise to a legal "right to know," while the bar to sharing records for
law enforcement purposes would limit the consequences of the
latter. In any event, the problem of false statements of fact in in-
take records can be dealt with by means other than wholesale ac-
cess to their contents. 125 On the other hand, it is hardly cynical to
suspect that less benign motives lie behind many such requests.
In the absence of privilege, the request for records may serve to
intimidate a victim seeking to escape domination by her batterer.
His access to her statements to intake staff signals that even af-
ter her physical departure, he retains the capacity to monitor her
account of the relationship to others. If he is consumed by anger
or aggression, he may be want to learn what she is saying about
him to further fuel his violent proclivities.'26 Any of these aims is
a far cry from the fact-finder's need for pertinent evidence, espe-
cially in a criminal case' 2 7-a need that is routinely defeated by
established privileges.
Moreover, a lack of privilege will undermine the effectiveness
of intake regardless of whether a particular request for records is
propelled by such dark motives. Victims' knowledge of batterers'
right to obtain intake records will evoke understandable concern
over whether and why that right might be exercised. With an in-
delible grasp of her batterer's capacity for violence, a victim might
well hesitate to volunteer information that could incur physical
retaliation. Thus, victims' awareness of their batterers' access to
intake records will tend strongly to chill their willingness to be
forthcoming in the way that successful intake requires. In this re-
spect, the justification for the proposed intake privilege resembles
the rationale for shield laws: without assurance of confidentiality,
125. While it is beyond the scope of this article to offer a comprehensive scheme for the
operational details of the proposed privilege, a state could readily craft means to discour-
age false statements at intake and to mitigate their effects. Penalties for unauthorized
dissemination of information in intake records, limited access by parties who can make an
independent prima facie showing that records portray them falsely, and susceptibility of
knowingly false assertions to the state's defamation laws are among measures that come
to mind.
126. See FAITH AND LIBERTY'S PLACE, INTAKE ISSUES: FLP FAMILY CENTER (on file with
authors).
127. See Cheney v. United States Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 384 (2004) (stating that "the
need for information in the criminal context is much weightier because 'our historic[all
commitment to the rule of law .. .is nowhere more profoundly manifest than in our view
that "the twofold aim [of criminal justice] is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suf-
fer"" (alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
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the only source of valuable information will perceive it to be
against her best interest to provide it.
Finally, the special circumstances of supervised visitation point
to two additional grounds for statutorily enforceable confidential-
ity for intake records. First, if disseminated beyond the setting
and purpose for which they are intended, these internal records
can easily be misconstrued and abused. 2 ' In eliciting statements
from a victim about her batterer's conduct, intake staff are not
seeking to build a legal case against the batterer. Rather, they
are attempting to make a reasoned judgment about the risk posed
by the batterer's participation in visitation, and to a lesser extent,
about the state of mind of the victim. Accordingly, the degree of
certainty to be attached to the victim's representations need not
be as high as would be expected for the resolution of formal adju-
dication. Allowing the circulation of records to individuals where
this context is not well understood may lead to the casual dis-
semination of the victim's allegations as proven facts, with poten-
tially harmful consequences.' 29
A second feature of visitation supporting formal safeguards of
confidentiality is the number of people who may be exposed to in-
take records. In the case of traditional privileges such as those for
the attorney-client and physician-patient relationships, the pro-
tected communication would ordinarily be entrusted to a single
individual. In general, the security of that communication rests
reliably on that person's adherence to professional canons of con-
duct. No such assurance, however, attends the exchanges that
take place at intake. While intake may be conducted by a lone
staff member, it is likely that others will also be consulting the
record of that session. Turnover at supervised visitation centers is
often high. 3 0 Even where it is not, the rotation of shifts makes it
likely that a number of staff will be apprised of the contents of
the records. Indeed, it is this lack of continuity of responsibility
128. Supervised visitation programs also keep other records, created after intake: e.g.,
observation notes, critical incident reports, and visit logs/attendance records. See Nat
Stern & Karen Oehme, The Troubling Admission of Supervised Visitation Records in Cus-
tody Proceedings, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 271, 278-81 (2002).
129. Concern with ascribing undue weight to a victim's statements in a sense repre-
sents the flip side of objections to admitting supervised visitation records into proceedings
for the determination of custody. There, the artificiality of a parent's best conduct recorded
during monitored visitation can produce an unduly benign picture of the parent's fitness.
See id.
130. See id. at 281 & n.74.
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that necessitates the creation and maintenance of records in the
first place. Moreover, unlike attorneys and physicians, visitation
staff are not required to meet rigorous standards of education and
licensing.131 As the number of such persons exposed to intake re-
cords multiplies, so do the chances that sensitive information will
be inappropriately divulged. An explicit legal mandate of confi-
dentiality would go far toward reducing these odds.
D. Building on the Counselor-Victim Privilege
In logic if not scope, the proposed privilege for intake records
represents an extension of laws providing for the confidentiality
of communications between sexual assault or domestic violence
victims and their counselors. Every state and the District of Co-
lumbia has enacted some form of this privilege.132 Aside from
each containing narrow exceptions, including provisions for vic-
tim consent, statutes vary in their central restriction. Some con-
tain a flat prohibition on the disclosure of victims' confidential
communications with counselors. 33 Others more specifically bar
such disclosure at a formal proceeding.3 In a number of states,
the ban is framed as a privilege authorizing the victim to prevent
others from disclosing confidential statements made to counsel-
ors. 1 35 Somewhat more permissive are statutes that forbid com-
pelled testimony about confidential communications between
counselors and victims, 136 thus apparently leaving open the pos-
131. See id. at 281; Nat Stern & Karen Oehme, Toward a Coherent Approach to Tort
Immunity in Judicially Mandated Family Court Services, 92 KY. L.J. 373, 432-33 (2003-
2004).
132. E.g., ALA. CODE §§ 15-23-40 to -45 (LexisNexis 1995 & Supp. 2005); CAL. EVID.
CODE §§ 1035-1035.8 (West 1995 & Supp. 2006) (addressing sexual assault); id. §§ 1037-
1037.8 (addressing domestic violence); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-37-6-1 to -9 (LexisNexis 1998
& Supp. 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-22.14 to .15 (West 1994 & Supp. 2006); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 44.071(a) (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2006).
133. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.20A(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 233, § 20J (LexisNexis 2000 & Supp. 2006) (addressing sexual assault); id. ch. 233, §
20K (addressing domestic violence); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 44.071(a), (c)
(Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2006).
134. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146k(b) (West 2005 & Supp. 2006); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-802.1(d), -802.2(c) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-
12-116(b) (2005).
135. E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1035-1035.8 (West 1995 & Supp. 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 90.5035(2), .5036(2) (West 1999 & Supp. 2006); HAW. R. EVID. 505.5(7)(b) (1993 & Supp.
2005); KY. R. EVID. 506(b) (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 49.2547 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-C:2(I) (LexisNexis 2001).
136. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. § 32-25-3 (2000); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4510(b)(2) (Consol. 2003 &
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sibility of voluntary disclosure. Potentially most porous are those
laws that confine their ban on disclosure to programs receiving
funds from the state. 137
The most stringent of these protections emphatically embody
the understanding that
any risk of disclosure [of communications between a battered woman
and her counselor] necessarily inhibits the victim from freely reveal-
ing her fears, feelings, and anxieties, thereby limiting the effective-
ness of the counseling. Any hesitation to disclose this sensitive in-
formation to a counselor impairs the counselor's ability to help the
victim make a full recovery.
Likewise, the strict confidentiality that we propose for communi-
cations at intake is designed to advance the twin goals of foster-
ing ample disclosure by victims and effective assistance by visita-
tion staff. While counseling and intake obviously differ in
function and dynamics, neither can fully serve its purpose in the
absence of vital information that can be obtained only from vic-
tims. The counselor-victim privilege recognizes that these often
frightened and intimidated individuals need firm assurance that
they will not be endangered by their cooperation with those seek-
ing to help them. The privilege for intake records would apply
this insight to a setting that also holds much promise for the wel-
fare of victims and their children.
E. Limitations on Exceptions
The exceptions included in our proposed privilege for intake re-
cords are, we believe, self-evident and uncontroversial on the
whole. It is worth underscoring their narrow scope, however, to
avoid defeating the purpose of the privilege by overly expansive
interpretation. In particular, we elaborate here on what we per-
ceive as the limited character of two of these exceptions.
First, the obligation to report indications of imminent physical
harm must be understood in the special context of intake in do-
2006).
137. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.220(1)(5) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 48-26-701(a) (LexisNexis 2004).
138. Michael B. Bressman & Fernando R. Laguarda, Jaffee v. Redmond: Towards Rec-
ognition of a Federal Counselor-Battered Woman Privilege, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 319,
345-46 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
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mestic violence cases. While this provision has obvious parallels
in exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient and attorney-client
privileges, it should not be regarded as identical to them in all re-
spects. A psychotherapist's duty to warn of potentially dangerous
patients on pain of civil liability is famously associated with the
California Supreme Court's decision in Tarasoff v. Regents of the
University of California.'39 The court ruled that when a therapist
"does in fact determine, or under applicable professional stan-
dards reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses a
serious danger of violence to others, [the therapist] bears a duty
to exercise reasonable care to protect the foreseeable victim of
that danger." 4 ° This duty to warn or otherwise to protect persons
to whom a patient appears to pose a serious threat has been
adopted by most other states.'41
While both therapists and intake staff must try to avert fore-
seeable harm, the therapist's duty stands on the solid footing of
professional training and intimate familiarity with the patient. 142
Accordingly, without presuming to predict behavior with cer-
tainty, the therapist can act with confidence on a conclusion that
a patient poses a significant risk of dangerous conduct. Visitation
staff, on the other hand, often lack the professional credentials
and close relationships that allow therapists to exercise consider-
able latitude in judging potential threats. Moreover, the civil or-
der entered by the court 1 3 has already established that the bat-
terer is considered a danger to the victim; release of statements
made at intake should therefore be confined to instances where
the statements clearly indicate an additional risk of harm. To re-
port this information on a lesser showing without the victim's
consent would undermine not only the integrity of the privilege,
but also the victim's ability to participate in decisions about her
safety. Thus, staff should be cautious about compromising the
confidentiality of intake communications based on a unilateral
judgment of imminent danger. At a minimum, visitation centers
139. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
140. Id. at 345.
141. See Currie v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 1074, 1078 (M.D.N.C. 1986), affd, 836
F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that there has been "virtually universal judicial approval
of the Tarasoff decision"); George C. Harris, The Dangerous Patient Exception to the Psy-
chotherapist-Patient Privilege: The Tarasoff Duty and the Jaffee Footnote, 74 WASH. L.
REV. 33, 46 (1999).
142. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345.
143. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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should have a process in place whereby suspected signs of im-
pending violence are assessed by designated figures within the
center before being reported to outsiders.
The exception to the attorney-client privilege for disclosure of
information where a lawyer believes it necessary "to prevent rea-
sonably certain death or substantial bodily harm"144 similarly af-
fords an imprecise analogy to its counterpart at intake. Though
not possessing the psychotherapist's clinical insights, an attorney
will normally have a broader perspective on the client's circum-
stances than that produced by intake staffs limited encounters
with victims. Moreover, clients will have directly announced their
own intentions,14 whereas intake staff must typically discern a
batterer's plans through the filter of his former partner's repre-
sentations. While these representations must of course be taken
seriously, they do not carry the same degree of reliability as the
client's firsthand revelation. In addition, an attorney's familiarity
with the justice system and law enforcement will impart a deeper
sense of appropriate occasions to report otherwise confidential
communications. Again, these considerations do not eliminate a
visitation staffs duty to report clear evidence of imminent harm,
but rather counsel against them too readily inferring the exis-
tence of a definite threat.
In addition, similar or even greater caution should be observed
with the exception for disclosure by consent of the party whose
statements at intake are being sought. Given the vulnerability of
victims, the potential for at least tacit coercion in this situation is
obvious. To assure that waiver of the privilege is knowing and
voluntary, certain minimum safeguards should be observed.
Waiver should be express and formal; rarely if ever should the
doctrine of implied waiver 46 operate in this setting.147 Further-
more, the consent form should contain an explanation of the
party's legal privilege and the meaning of waiver, as well as an
affirmation that the party has read and understood both of these.
144. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1); e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 956.5 (West
1995 & Supp. 2006).
145. See, e.g., People v. Dang, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 767 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Mulka v.
Fain, No. CV89-0363274S, 1994 WL 146793, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 14, 1994).
146. See Developments in the Law, supra note 91, at 1629-65.
147. Should a compelling need for intake communications arise in which a party could
plausibly be deemed to have implicitly consented, we propose that the justification have to
meet the requirements for the catchall exception. See supra Part III.A.
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Finally, ideally as a matter of law, but at least as practicing pol-
icy, active steps should be taken to discourage the grant of con-
sent without due consideration or under duress. Possible re-
quirements include a mandatory waiting period, an interview
with the visitation center's supervisor, and consultation with an
attorney.
CONCLUSION
The need for protection of victims' intake records is so apparent
that its absence may best be explained by legislative inattention
to this relatively new problem. Encouragement of candor, which
lies at the heart of existing privileges, is indispensable to the
communication that takes place at the threshold stage of super-
vised visitation. It is not our position that a privilege promoting
this aim must mirror every detail of our proposal. What is crucial
is that legislatures take steps to ensure that those who conduct
supervised visitation receive the information that they need to
perform this vital service.
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